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THE MATERIAL BEARING

OF THE

TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN IN 1862

UPON THE

DESTINIES OF OUR CIVIL WAR.

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Class E 472

Book 9
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THE TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN

DECISIVE OF THE WAR.

AUTHOR OF THE PLAN.

All writers upon our civil war concede that the movement which transferred the national armies from Cairo and the northern part of Kentucky to their new base in northern Mississippi and Alabama on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, was the decisive campaign of the war.

It made the destruction of the "Southern Confederacy" inevitable. It sapped it to its foundation, and thenceforth, it decayed, grew ripe for destruction and smouldered to its fall.

But, while there has been universal assent as to the vital importance of the Tennessee campaign, it was not until the report of the Military Committee of the United States Senate, nine years after, that it became known to whom the merit of the plan belonged. This report establishes the fact, that on the 30th of November, 1861, Miss Carroll, of Maryland, presented to the War Department at Washington, an elaborate plan for this campaign, which was adopted by the administration, and there can be *no doubt* that future critical researches, by bringing more clearly to light the dangers which then hazarded the Union, will not only *confirm* this judgment, but will lift it to a place which belongs only to the most extraordinary strategic movements in ancient or modern warfare, and invest the author with an historic interest not heretofore conceived.

MILITARY SITUATION.

It is impossible to comprehend the tremendous importance of this plan without a knowledge of the military situation.

In the autumn of '61, the Confederate States had acquired an organization and *consistency*, strong enough to put in the field and maintain a military power too formidable to be overthrown by any power the National Government could bring against it, on any of the *lines of operation* known to the administration.

If this rebel power could gain time to prepare for replenishing its warlike material by the creation of machine power, it was numerous enough and *rich* enough in intellectual and material resources to resist indefinitely, if not able to destroy the Union altogether. No blockade could so curtail its supplies of warlike material but what was rapidly being supplemented by the energies of the people.

Could the National armies, however, penetrate the central region so as to break up their internal lines of connection and, at the same time, disorganize their industrial system, the Confederacy would be geographically cut in two, and their ability to create *resources* for large armies *forever destroyed*.

GENERAL SCOTT'S VIEW, &c.

The popular opinion that the North, by its *supposed* superiority in numbers, wealth and intelligence, could readily weaken and reduce the South, yielded to sounder views. General Scott perceived, (and he was the greatest military authority at the time,) that 12,000,000 of people in a central position, with interior lines of communication, was on military principles, an over-match for 18,000,000, and he retired to West Point for the reason, perhaps, that he despaired of being able to conquer the rebellion.

General Sherman gave up the command at Louisville because he did not perceive how he could succeed with their resources, and

as he expressed it, saw no light until the battle of Donelson. The Adjutant General reported the inability to move in Missouri.

The necessity of a Committee on the conduct of the war, proved the anxiety and doubt of success that was felt, and their report shows that the main reliance was on the Army of the Potomac.

NO MILITARY PLAN KNOWN TO THE GOVERNMENT COULD
HAVE SAVED THE UNION.

Nothing is more certain than that the *rebel* power was able to resist all the power of the Union, and keep her armies from striking their resources and *interior lines of communication* upon any of the plans or lines of operation on which the Union armies were operating. Geographically considered, there was but one line which the National armies could take and maintain, and that was *unthought of, unknown*, and would not have been found out in all human probability, in time to have prevented a collapse or warded off recognition and intervention, but for Miss Carroll.

The failure to reduce Vicksburg from the water, after a tremendous sacrifice of life and treasure, and the time it took to take Richmond, furnish irrefragable proof of the inability of the Union to subdue the rebellion on the plan of our ablest Generals. And when it is urged that the National Generals would have found and adopted the Tennessee, we answer so they would in *the course of time*, had that time been vouchsafed to them, but there was no time for *experiments*—no time for educating our Generals—that line of operation which would place the National armies in command of a *decisive* point, had to be gained in a few months—that is *before the opening of the spring of '62*, or the *Union must contend not only against the rebel power, but against England and France*, and contend too, with an *exhausted, bankrupt treasury, and a divided North*. England and France had resolved that duty to their suffering operatives required the raising of the blockade, for the sup-

ply of cotton, and nothing prevented *that* intervention but the progress of the National armies up the Tennessee.

THE TENNESSEE RIVER.

It is established beyond controversy that it was by the adoption of this river as the line of operations, that the National armies reached a *central position* in the Confederacy, *destroyed or broke their connecting lines* and *overthrew the rebel power* by *depriving him of his resources*, and that *this point* could not have been gained, and these resources taken from him on any one of the *lines* on which our armies were operating, for had it been possible in a military sense to gain these decisive points at all, on those lines, they could by no possibility have done so in time to have prevented the loss of the Union.

From the rebel strength and position, no army the National Government could muster would have conquered the rebellion on any plan of military operations conceived by the Government. For operating on any *safe base* on any *known line*, the National armies were numerically not strong enough to reach the *vitals*—the *decisive point*.

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC NOT HALF WAY.

The Army of the Potomac was three years and upwards reaching Richmond, and was then not half the distance to a decisive point, and had Lee been able to recruit his army, which was made impossible by the Tennessee campaign that opened the gates for the march of Sherman, Lee would have been the superior at Appomatox Court House.

VICKSBURG AND MOBILE EASILY REDUCED IN 1862.

The Mississippi expedition was baffled at Vicksburg long enough to show that it would have taken *years in time* to have reduced all the fortifications on that stream, operating on its waters.

The army of Buel had for its objective point Knoxville, in East Tennessee, and as stated by General McClellan, was *preliminary* in aid of his move on Richmond. The several naval expeditions had for their object the enforcement of the blockade and incidentally to cripple the enemy in his coast line and railroad supplies. Admiral Farragut's expedition designed the capture of New Orleans, and if possible to open the Mississippi as high as he might be able.

The record evidence furnished by Miss Carroll's paper on the reduction of Vicksburg, is proof conclusive that in 1862 she was in advance of the ablest military strategists, she pointed out the way of success, and when they stopped short at Corinth and attempted to take Vicksburg on the water, she showed the administration that Vicksburg would necessarily fall by the occupation of Jackson as certainly as did Memphis by the occupation of Corinth, and the proper and only plan to open the Mississippi was to take its strongholds in the rear. It is perfectly demonstrated that *twelve months was wasted away with an enormous drain upon the resources of the country in men and material* by the effort to take Vicksburg from the river, and that both Vicksburg and Mobile could have been reduced in 1862, and Corinth, Meridian and Mobile, made to play the part of Chattanooga, Atlanta and Savannah in 1864 and 1865.

STRENGTH OF THE REBELLION.

At the time Miss Carroll proposed to the Government to abandon the Mississippi expedition the war had been waged over six months, but with the exception of West Virginia, the battle had been steadily against the Union.

The rebels who were thoroughly prepared at the onset had extended their battle lines to the Potomac, effectually closing its navigation; thence westward through the southern part of Kentucky to Columbus, which they had strongly fortified, sealing the

navigation of the Mississippi, and thence westward to the Rio Grande.

They were complete masters of all the territory southward to the Gulf. They had formally admitted Kentucky and Missouri into their Confederacy, and resolved to move their seat of government to Nashville, and were preparing to extend their battle lines to the northern limits of those States, and the Adjutant General after a tour of inspection reported that the force was not then sufficient to hold Kentucky and Missouri to the Union. Thus, while the two armies were confronting each other in sight of Washington events were rapidly pressing in the southwest, which if unchecked, would change the destiny of ages. The Confederacy needed but to maintain its strongholds a few months longer to secure admission into the family of nations. It was then plain to the administration that England and France were prepared and anxious to make common cause with the South, and European war with the United States was imminent. The Government was under the *absolute necessity therefore, of inflicting some decisive blow upon the rebellion in the next few months, not only to ward off foreign intervention and invasion, but to smother the spirit of secession in the northwest and prevent financial bankruptcy, which of itself must destroy the nation.*

GRAND ARMY OF THE POTOMAC A MISTAKE.

It became a question then of painful doubt whether success could be obtained upon any plan upon which our armies were operating. The Army of the Potomac and the Army of the West were the two grand expeditions on which the administration relied. The first had for its objective point, the rebel capital, and the destruction of the rebel army of the east; and the combined military and naval expedition of the west had for its objective point the opening of the Mississippi, the seizure of the important termini of the railroads in the south, and the destruction of their resources

in the west. All other expeditions were designed as auxiliary to these great movements. This was the plan for the military destruction of the rebel power, and upon this plan it is demonstrable that no satisfactory result could have been secured in time to have prevented the loss of the Union. The Army of the Potomac, after having been put upon a scale of rare magnificence, as complete as possible consistent with mobility, and after several changes of the ablest commanders, took three years and a half to reach Richmond and destroy Lee's army—and it never could have been made strong enough to have captured Richmond but for the decisive campaign of the Army of the West upon the line of the Tennessee river. Strategically, an invasion always leads to deep lines of operations, which are always dangerous in a hostile country on account of the difficulty of maintaining communication with its base. Every mile the National armies advanced, every victory they gained, carried them farther from their base, and required an increase of force for the protection of their communications;—while every retreat of the enemy brought him nearer his resources, and it is *mathematically certain* that he would soon have reached the point on that line, where he would have been the superior power.

THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND POSSESSING NO MATERIAL INFLUENCE.

But even had chance thrown Richmond into the hands of our army at an earlier day it could not have materially influenced the war. Capitals in foreign wars, however important as seats of political power, can have very little strategic value in an insurgent and unrecognized power, and from the geographical position of Richmond, it had none at all, for they had resolved and were prepared to move it any day. The rebels might have surrendered Richmond, and all the Atlantic States to Florida, and yet have maintained their independence. Could they have re-

tained their power over the Mississippi valley a few months longer, they would have so connected themselves with France through Texas, and with England through the States of the Northwest, as not only to have made good their independence, but to have dwarfed the United States to the area of the old thirteen, and taken the lead as the controlling political power on this continent. With the Mississippi river in their possession to the mouth of the Ohio, the presence of the English and French fleets at New Orleans would have brought about this result.

SACRIFICE OF LIFE AND YEARS OF TRIAL IN TAKING RICHMOND.

The Army of the Potomac, therefore, though seeming to the country of such signal moment, occupied an attitude of comparative insignificance, when contrasted with the Army of the Southwest, and the tremendous *sacrifice of life and years of trial* in taking Richmond was a military mistake. A defensive force was the true antagonism, and an invading column in the valley, by using the Tennessee river first, and then the reduction of Mobile would have brought our armies on the *navigable waters* of the *Alabama river*, which would have given them that river as a *base at the South*; and with the *Tennessee river* as the *northern base*, the armies of the east and the armies of the west would have been in *supporting distance of each other*. By resting on the mountains the *left* and holding their right, they could have pushed the enemy back east of Atlanta, compressing him in the slip between it and the mountains, in '62, and with much greater ease than three years after in 1865.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE MISSISSIPPI EXPEDITION.

The vital necessity of regaining the Mississippi and striking a blow upon the resources in its great valley, was fully appreciated by President Lincoln, who rightly perceived at the com-

mencement of hostilities, that decisive results must be obtained in the west; and the combined military and naval expedition *to go down the Mississippi* was regarded by him as the most important of the war, and he reserved to himself its *special direction as Commander-in-Chief*. This campaign was designed by the aid of the expedition from the Gulf to clear the Mississippi to its mouth, and as we have said, to seize and hold the termini of the important railroads south. Could this expedition succeed? Could it open the Mississippi to its mouth? These were momentous questions, while the very delay in military movements was weakening the confidence of the country, as well as confirming foreign powers in their behalf, that the government had neither the strength nor ability to conquer the rebellion. But had the expedition succeeded in opening the Mississippi, could they from any point on that river have delivered a *decisive* blow upon the Confederate power?

After a reconnoissance on Columbus at the engagement of Belmont, Commodore Foote reported that *it* could not be reduced without a very large co-operating land force in its rear. Below Columbus, there were many strongly fortified positions, where, from the nature of the *ground*, no efficient land force could co-operate.

These considerations, fully appreciated by the enemy, made it absolutely certain, that if reliance was upon this expedition, the country was gone.

BUT ONE WAY TO THE CENTER.

The United States were not so superior in numbers and resources to the South, as to have destroyed the rebel armies of the East or opened the Mississippi, so long as the rebels could maintain their interior lines complete. No display of military genius could have extorted from Lee his sword, so long as his resources were unwasted. No valor on the part of our navies and armies

could have taken the fortifications on the Mississippi, *so long as the rebels could keep open their lines of communication.* If the National Government is to maintain itself against the rebellion, it *must reach their center and deliver a blow upon their resources.* There was but *one* avenue by which our armies could reach this decisive point and that was the Tennessee river. By taking that river, the combined military and naval expedition could secure a base in Mississippi and Alabama from which the fatal blow could be delivered. That river was navigable for gunboats to the foot of the muscle shoals in Alabama, within hearing of the locomotives of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, *the only complete bond of communication between the rebel armies of the East, and the rebel armies of the Mississippi valley.*

MISS CARROLL SOLVES THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

These tremendous facts in the supreme moments of our National existence *were unknown or overlooked by all the military commanders of the country.* From the evidence it is clear that to Miss Carroll belongs the exclusive merit of having influenced the administration to transfer the Army of the West from Cairo on the north line of the Kentucky to a new base in Mississippi and Alabama on the Tennessee river in February, 1862, *in time to save the country from the breaking down of its finances, to stop the discontent in the northwest, and prevent the intervention of England and France by raising the blockade.* She had the genius to grasp the situation and perceive that the fall of Richmond could not destroy the rebellion, and the Mississippi river could not be opened on its waters; that the Government must seize a strategic position within the cotton States, and if a fatal blow could be inflicted, it must fall there. To her, therefore, must be given the credit of having solved the problem for the military destruction of the "Southern Confederacy."

On the 12th of November, 1861, she wrote from St. Louis to the Hon. Edward Bates at Washington, the member of the Cabinet who first suggested the gunboats for the Mississippi expedition, that from the information she had derived, she believed *that expedition would fail*, and urged him to try and have it directed up the Tennessee river, as the true line of attack, and enclosed a similar letter to Hon. Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, and on the 30th of November laid before the War Department the following paper :

The civil and military authorities seem to be laboring under a great mistake in regard to the true key of the war in the Southwest. It is not the Mississippi, but the Tennessee River. Now all the military preparations made in the west indicate that the Mississippi River is the point to which the authorities are directing their attention. On that river many battles must be fought and heavy risks incurred, before any impression can be made on the enemy, all of which could be avoided by using the Tennessee River. This river is navigable for medium-class boats to the foot of the Muscle Shoals in Alabama, and is opened to navigation all the year, while the distance is but two hundred and fifty miles by the river from Paducah, on the Ohio. The Tennessee offers many advantages over the Mississippi. We should avoid the almost impregnable batteries of the enemy, which cannot be taken without great danger and great risk of life to our forces, from the fact that our boats, if crippled, would fall a prey to the enemy by being swept by the current to him, and away from the relief of our friends. But even should we succeed, still we will only have begun the war, for we shall then have to fight to the country from whence the enemy derives his supplies.

Now, an advance up the Tennessee River would avoid this danger ; for, if our boats were crippled, they would drop back with the current and escape capture.

But a still greater advantage would be its tendency to *cut the enemy's lines in two*, by reaching the Memphis and Charleston railroad, threatening Memphis, which lies one hundred miles due west, and no defensible point between ; also Nashville, only ninety miles northeast, and Florence and Tusculumbia in North Alabama, forty miles east. A movement in this direction would do more to relieve our friends in Kentucky, and inspire the loyal hearts in East Tennessee, than the possession of the whole of the Mississippi River. If well executed, it would cause the evacuation of all those formidable fortifications on which the rebels ground their hopes for success ; and, in the event of our fleet attacking Mobile, the presence of our troops in the northern part of Alabama would be material aid to the fleet.

Again, the aid our forces would receive from the loyal men in Tennessee

would enable them soon to crush the last traitor in that region, and *the separation of the two extremes* would do more than one hundred battles for the Union cause.

The Tennessee river is crossed by the Memphis and Louisville railroad and the Memphis and Nashville railroad. At Hamburg the river makes the big bend on the east, touching the northeast corner of Mississippi, entering the northwest corner of Alabama, forming an arc to the south, entering the State of Tennessee at the northeast corner of Alabama, and if it does not touch the northwest corner of Georgia, comes very near it. It is but eight miles from Hamburg to the Memphis and Charleston railroad, which goes through Tusculumbia, only two miles from the river, which it crosses at Decatur, thirty miles above, intersecting with the Nashville and Chattanooga road at Stephenson. The Tennessee river has never less than three feet to Hamburg on the "shoalest" bar, and, during the fall, winter and spring months, there is always water for the largest boats that are used on the Mississippi river. It follows from the above facts, that in making the Mississippi the key to the war in the West, or rather in overlooking the Tennessee river, the subject is not understood by the superiors in command.

That this plan as suggested, was adopted, we submit the following letter from Hon. Thomas A. Scott, then Assistant Secretary of War :

Hon. JACOB M. HOWARD, *United States Senate* :

On or about the 30th of November, 1861, Miss Carroll, as stated in her memorial, called on me as Assistant Secretary of War, and suggested the propriety of abandoning the expedition which was then preparing to descend the Mississippi river, and to adopt instead the Tennessee river, and handed to me the plan of campaign, as appended to her memorial, which plan I submitted to the Secretary of War, and its general ideas were adopted. On my return from the Southwest, in 1862, I informed Miss Carroll, as she states in her memorial, that through the adoption of this plan the country had been saved millions, and that it entitled her to the kind consideration of Congress.

THOS. A. SCOTT.

SECRETARY CAMERON AND COL. SCOTT.

Secretary Cameron and Col. Scott, both men of uncommon administrative capacities, saw at once its *vital* power. They comprehended, better perhaps, than any military man at that day, the value of the railroad system of the South, and its uses in war. Col. Scott said it was the first clear solution of the difficult problem. He saw that the *seizure of the Memphis and Charleston rail-*

road would separate the Confederacy and place our armies in the very heart of the rebellion. He saw, too, what no military man had perceived at that period, that the shortest road to the rebel armies of the East as well as to their impregnable fortifications on the Mississippi river, was upon the line of the Tennessee river, and without a word, without an allusion to himself or the author, he brought about that change which inflicted the mortal wound upon the Confederate power. When the enemy's centre was pierced at Henry the decisive point was gained. Columbus, Bowling Green and Donelson at once became untenable.

THE BATTLE OF DONELSON.

A. S. Johnson withdrew his forces from Bowling Green and made a stand at Donelson *only with a hope of gaining time* for concentrating his army to cover the Memphis and Charleston railroad.

The expedition against Donelson was in aid of Buel's march on Knoxville, and no part of the grand campaign to Corinth, and while the achievement served to satisfy the popular craving for victory at the time, it had no influence beside, and instead of advancing it really retarded that campaign and came well nigh proving fatal to the Union at Pittsburg Landing.

THE GRAND RESULTS TO THE UNION AND SLAVERY.

Beauregard, then in command, called frightfully for reinforcements from Pemberton's army; "if defeated," said he, "we lose the Mississippi valley and probably our cause, whereas we could afford to lose Charleston and Savannah for the purpose of defeating Buel's army which would not only insure us the valley of the Mississippi, but our independence." It was true, for the seizure of their railroad connections caused the *evacuation* of all their strong fortifications on the Mississippi on which they relied for *indepen-*

dence, and opened that river from Cairo to Vicksburg, averted European war with the United States, revived the National credit, and forced the enemy back to the Vicksburg and Meridian railroad, and brought the National armies in contact with the slave population of the cotton States, which turned over four millions of their people, until then a source of their strength, against them and to the support of the Union, making it absolutely impossible longer to maintain slavery!

NOVEL AND STARTLING FACTS.

The army as well as the country were confronted by novel and startling facts—the moral and material effect of their presence in *sight of a million of slaves was an almighty fact*. Why the National armies halted and extended their lines eastward and westward, and moved down from Memphis to Vicksburg, instead of following up their pursuit and delivering the finishing blow, does not appear. It is not improbable, however, that the first success, taking a position in Alabama and Mississippi on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, so satisfied the country and the world that *the rebellion was in the power of the National armies*; that the mind became dissipated on indefinite routes and numerous objects occupied the attention of the Government.

READY TO SURRENDER.

The victory at Pittsburg Landing and the march on Corinth, hurled the rebel battle line to the Vicksburg and Meridian railroad, and had our army moved down on Iuka and Vicksburg road at once, Vicksburg would have as assuredly surrendered to our fleet as did Memphis on the fall of Corinth, and the enemy been thrown back on the Alabama river; and had Farragut gone to Mobile in May, after the fall of New Orleans, the rebel left would have been pushed east of Chattanooga and Atlanta.

REDUCTION OF VICKSBURG.

The author of the plan observing this departure addressed the War Department through Hon. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, enclosing a map which she had prepared of the profile of the river at that place. In this paper, Miss Carroll pointed out the difficulties of reducing Vicksburg from the river, and said:

"It is impossible to take Vicksburg in front without too great a loss of life and material, for the reason that the river is only about half a mile wide and our forces would be in point-blank range of their guns, not only from their water batteries which line the shore, but from the batteries that crown the hills, while the enemy would be protected by their elevation from the range of our fire."

"By examining the map enclosed, you will at once perceive why a place of so little apparent strength has been able to resist the combined fleets of the upper and lower Mississippi."

"The most *economical* plan for the reduction of Vicksburg, *now*, is to push a column from Memphis or Corinth down the Mississippi Central railroad to Jackson, the capital of the State of Mississippi. The occupation of Jackson and the command of the railroad to New Orleans would compel the immediate evacuation of Vicksburg, as well as the retreat of the entire rebel army East of that line, and by another movement of our army from Jackson, Mississippi, or from Corinth to Meridian in the State of Mississippi, on the Mobile railroad, especially if aided by a movement of our gun-boats on Mobile, the Confederate forces with all the disloyal men and their slaves would be compelled to fly East of the Tombigbee river. Of course I would have the gun-boats with a small force at Vicksburg, as auxiliary to this movement. With regard to the canal, Vicksburg can be rendered useless to the Confederate army upon the very first rise of the river, but I do not advise this because Vicksburg belongs to the United States, and we desire to hold and fortify it—for the *Mississippi river* at Vicksburg and the *Vicksburg and Jackson railroad* will become necessary as a base for our future operations. Vicksburg might have been reduced eight months ago as I then advised, after the fall of Henry, and with much more ease than it can be done to-day."

Perhaps there never was a plan of campaign so elaborate in detail, which was so fully justified in its results, as that of the Tennessee. And as if to furnish its strategic wisdom, the defeat of our arms at Vicksburg demonstrated the impossibility of having succeeded in time to save the Union, upon the plan of our military commanders.

THE VALUE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

The value of this campaign is incomputable. It can only be measured by the value of the Union. It saved the useless sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of lives. It was worth to the country an army of a million of men. The war was then costing from two to three millions per day; how many days it was shortened by the abandonment of the expedition down the Mississippi, may be conjectured by the time that was wasted in attempting to take Vicksburg on the river. It is not too much to say, three thousand millions was saved the taxpayers of the nation.

WAR, LIBERTY AND FINANCE.

War, if long continued, must ever be detrimental to liberty, by the weight of debt, accumulation of powers in the Government and the military habits it superinduces. These considerations began to weigh in the autumn of '61, as the difficulties in waging the war were more clearly developed; it had then cost upwards of two hundred millions over all receipts of the Government, and if protracted another year, this excess, it was estimated would be over three hundred and eighty millions of dollars; but to put the armies upon a proper footing to conquer the rebellion, it was evident they must be enlarged on a much more costly scale. The loan of two hundred and fifty millions, had already absorbed all the capital that could be invested in Government securities at home. None could be borrowed abroad, for foreign capitalists believed the war could not reunite the Union, and without some palpable and unquestioned military advantage, the Government had no alternative but to resort to forced loans and taxation, which would have been equivalent to the confiscation of the property of the people.

VISIBLE AND GROWING DISCONTENT.

In this posture of affairs, the enthusiasm which enkindled on the fall of Sumter was visibly giving place to discontent, doubt, and even despair of the Union. President Lincoln began to inquire if the country would sustain him in the measures essential to end the rebellion. He knew that without positive military success it *could not*. The northwest was growing restive under a struggle, which seemed to be fruitless in good results, while it closed against them their commerical outlets, and reduced them to a condition of forced dependence upon a rival. They were connected too with the South, not only by the bond of the Mississippi river, but by an identity of political theories and ideas, and could the Confederate armies have succeeded in extending their battle lines to the upper Mississippi and Ohio rivers, it would have been a signal for as many rebel recruits from Illinois, Indiana and Ohio, as from Missouri and Kentucky, when the party of peace would have come to the front and demanded concessions from the National Government, or struck for independence.

FOREIGN POWERS ANXIOUS TO MAKE COMMON CAUSE
WITH THE SOUTH.

England and France, at the inception of the rebellion, acted on the theory of all the ruling classes of Europe, that the Union was permanently divided and no military force could reduce the Southern States. They recognized the belligerency of the South and sought to bring all the European governments to unite in the early recognition of her independence. With the exception of Russia, they all desired that the two sections should never again come together—not for any preference for the South, nor from jealousy of free institutions, but because of a dread of the consolidated power of the United States, and the apprehension that if

unchecked, it must sooner or later dominate over one-fourth of the globe, and wielding the resources of a continent with its hundreds of millions of people, must necessarily endanger all political systems. Besides these considerations the material interests of England and France determined them to make common cause with the South. Much of their statesmanship had for years been directed to the production of cotton, in which so many millions of their people were interested; and were the Southern States independent of the North, the most favorable commercial relations could be made with them. Besides the millions of their people engaged, more or less, in the cotton manufacture, large loans had been taken by English capitalists upon the cotton then in the South; and to protect all these interests, both England and France were considering late in the autumn of '61, whether it was not their duty to intervene in our struggle and raise the blockade. England, probably more anxious than France, delayed from deference to the anti-slavery sentiment of a large section of her people, for some plausible pretext, or until the cotton famine would unite them in support of the government. English and French fleets, larger than the entire American navy at that day, were in *striking distance*, prepared at any moment to raise the blockade and settle the whole question.

SUCCESS OR IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION AND INVASION.

Our representatives abroad warned the administration, that unless some undeniable and unexpected military success was obtained before spring, England and France had both determined to raise the blockade, and take part with the South; that no victory, nor series of victories would change the European policy; that it must be a *mortal* wound upon the rebellion, to convince them that a war with the United States would be a more costly experiment, than to feed their suffering poor.

THE CALAMITY THAT WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the calamities which would environ the American people *to-day* had not the Mississippi expedition been abandoned and the Tennessee campaign undertaken just at that time.

It is absolutely certain that this Union with all its countless blessings would have been forever lost and our experiment of free government would have been held in mockery and derision by all other political powers of the world.

IT DECIDED THE CONTEST.

This campaign must therefore take rank with those *few* remarkable strategic movements in the world's history which have decided the fate of empires and nations.

There have been female warriors who have led armies and given inspiration to conquering hosts, but there is not another instance where a woman, simply by the grasp and clearness of intellect, and the depth of her patriotism, and those instincts which characterize the refined and retiring woman, who has had the good fortune of Miss Anna Ella Carroll to mark an epoch in her country's civilization.



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